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Dialogue with the Eurasian Union on Ukraine – 
an opportunity or a trap?
Adam Eberhardt
The Eurasian Union (or, to give it its full name, the Eurasian Economic Union, EEU) is Russia’s 
flagship project, by use of which it aims to institutionally subordinate the post-Soviet states 
to itself using political ties and the projected common economic space. The Kremlin has so far 
managed to persuade Belarus and Kazakhstan, and tentatively also Armenia, to join this inte-
gration project, which on the surface looks like a multilateral initiative but in reality conceals 
a network of bilateral relations centred on Russia. However, in order for Russia to recon-
struct its influence in its neighbourhood permanently and without change, it is of key im-
portance that Ukraine is incorporated into the EEU. That still seemed feasible even in 2013, 
but the Maidan and the Russian-Ukrainian war have undone this possibility. However, they 
also opened up an alternative scenario for Russia, one in which the Western states recognise 
the Eurasian Union as a legitimate partner in discussions about a new order in Europe with 
a view to restoring peace in Ukraine. It is worth taking into account the strategic conse-
quences of that scenario. We need to consider if the idea which Moscow has been lobbying 
for – and which has found some supporters in Brussels and Berlin – threatens to take us back 
to the Cold War system of geopolitical blocs and implies recognition of Russia’s dominance 
over Ukraine and the other Eastern Partnership countries?
Russia’s plan to progressively vassalise Ukraine 
by making President Viktor Yanukovych gradu-
ally more dependent on Russian loans, by fos-
tering autocratic tendencies in Ukraine and by 
putting pressure on the Ukrainian leadership to 
opt for the Russian integration project instead 
of association with the European Union broke 
down as a result of the revolution in the Kiev 
Maidan. Russia’s response to the Ukrainian revo-
lution, i.e. the annexation of Crimea and the or-
chestration of the armed conflict in Donbass of-
fered Moscow a false sense of triumph, but will 
make it even more difficult for Russia’s strategic 
objective to be attained. The pro-democratic, 
anti-corruption and pro-European expectations 
that the Maidan had awoken in Ukrainians were 
joined by a rise in anti-Kremlin, and sometimes 
openly anti-Russian sentiments. In September 
2014, only 17% of Ukrainians were in favour of 
Ukraine joining the Eurasian Union, while 59% 
supported European integration (only two years 
earlier, in August 2012, supporters of Eurasian 
integration had the edge over those backing the 
EU, with figures of, respectively, 43% and 32%).1 
Irrespective of how the Russian-Ukrainian 
armed conflict develops and how the political 
situation changes in Ukraine, integration with 
Russia will remain a politically discredited idea 
in Ukraine for the foreseeable future, as was 
the case with Russian-Georgian relations after 
1 Cf. the surveys by the International Republican Institute: 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default /files/2014%20Octo-
ber%2014%20Survey%20of%20Residents%20of%20
Ukraine%2C%20September%2012-25%2C%202014.pdf
2OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 154
the war in 2008. In the case of Ukraine, this 
tendency will be strengthened by the exclusion 
of pro-Russian populations of Crimea and Don-
bass from the Ukrainian political space. 
The fact that Russia’s efforts to attract Ukraine 
to the Eurasian Union ended in failure does not 
mean that the project will no longer serve as 
an instrument in Russia’s policy towards Ukraine 
in its attempt to derail Ukraine’s European aspi-
rations and ultimately re-position it firmly in the 
Russian sphere of influence. It is no accident that 
the Russian leaders have been trying in recent 
weeks to persuade the Western states to devel-
op a mechanism for constant dialogue between 
the EU and the EEU, with a view to contributing 
to a de-escalation of tension in the region. Given 
the inefficacy of other peace formats, the initia-
tive has had a welcome reception from some Eu-
ropean politicians, including the German Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier.2 
Some opinion-making communities have also 
expressed the view that dialogue between the 
two institutions, when supported by a strong 
economic component, could be a way to de-
escalate the tension over Ukraine while also be-
ing a first step towards building the foundations 
of a new European order.3 
In reality, however, the prospects of any con-
structive dialogue about European economic 
integration between the EU and the EEU are 
currently non-existent. The European conflict 
triggered by Russia is strictly political in nature, 
and the alleged contradictions of economic 
interests are a mere excuse. Russia has stood 
up against the free trade zone between the EU 
and the Eastern Partnership countries not be-
cause it feared a worsening of its own terms 
2 Steinmeier: Europäische Friedensordnungsteht auf dem 
Spiel, Die Welt, 16.11.2014, 
h t tp: / / w w w.we l t .de /po l i t i k /deut s ch land /a r t i -
cle134378688/Europaeische-Friedensordnung-steht-
auf-dem-Spiel.html
3 Cf. I. Krastev, M. Leonard, The New European Disorder, 
ECFR, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR117_TheNewEuro-
peanDisorder_ESSAY.pdf
of foreign trade, but because it was concerned 
about the long-term geopolitical consequences 
of the possible modernisation of the participat-
ing states. Similarly, the main problem does not 
currently concern the trade sanctions imposed 
by Russia on Ukraine or those by the EU and 
Russia on each other, but the Russian tanks 
in Crimea and Donbass. In such circumstances, 
the proposal of economic dialogue between 
the EU and the EEU is a veiled invitation to seek 
a political compromise with Russia in a new for-
mat. And it is an invitation that is psychologi-
cally understandable, given the abysmal failure 
attempts made so far to normalise the situa-
tion; it is, however, also, politically naïve.
When analysing what use a change to the 
format of negotiations can be, it is necessary 
to depart from the assumption that Russia is 
not presently interested in a compromise that 
would allow the Ukrainian leadership to stabi-
lise the situation in the country and start the 
long overdue reforms. What it is interested 
in is transforming Ukraine into a permanently 
unstable and inefficient state that will serve as 
a warning for the region (and also the public 
in Russia) about where pro-European dreams 
end up in the post-Soviet area. This means that 
Russia will be prepared to make concessions 
and de-escalate the conflict only if continuing 
the current policy turns out to be too costly in 
relation to the gains it generates. It is there-
fore in the West’s interest to increase the price 
that Putin in paying for escalating the war, 
instead of meeting his expectations if there are 
The prospects of any constructive dia-
logue about European economic integra-
tion between the EU and the EEU are cur-
rently non-existent. The European conflict 
triggered by Russia is strictly political 
in nature, and the alleged contradictions 
of economic interests are a mere excuse.
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no guarantees of reciprocity. This is especially 
the case since concessions and a willingness to 
compromise are regarded as signs of weakness 
in the Russian political culture and only encour-
age more offensive action.
Accepting Russia’s proposal to recognise the 
Eurasian Union as a partner to the EU would 
appear to be a symmetric step while in fact 
it would not be. Unlike the democratic and 
(excessively) pluralistic European Union, which is 
the collective voice of a larger part of the con-
tinent, the EEU would be a mouthpiece of the 
regional hegemon whose aim is to force its 
neighbours into an integration project.
Transforming the format of negotiations by in-
cluding the EEU would have no impact on the 
actual decision-making process on the Rus-
sian side. As a structure controlled by Russia, 
the EEU would fully represent the Kremlin’s po-
sition in any negotiations, especially since the 
talks would concern subjects that are of fun-
damental importance for Russia, but not for 
Kazakhstan or even Belarus. There are no rea-
sons to believe that Mr Putin or Mr Lavrov 
would be more inclined to make concessions 
if they were speaking “on behalf of the EEU”. 
Conversely, if the Russian side becomes more 
willing to reach a compromise, the parties at 
the negotiation table will be able to work out 
such a compromise irrespective of the actual 
format the negotiations take.
Speaking on behalf of an international organi-
sation, it would be easier for Russian diplomacy 
to reject the West’s demands – it would posi-
tion itself as a reviewer and arbiter of an inter-
nal conflict in Ukraine, and not as a party to the 
conflict, obliged to make and deliver on com-
mitments. It was Russia, not the Eurasian Un-
ion, that annexed Crimea and started the war in 
Donbass by sending troops and arms and shell-
ing Ukraine’s border areas from its own territory. 
Therefore, restoring peace will require a change 
in the policy of Russia, not of the Eurasian Union 
which is a façade entity anyway when it comes 
to foreign policy competences.
Furthermore, bringing the EEU to the negotiat-
ing table would offer Russia a convenient argu-
ment to force Belarus and Kazakhstan to align 
their positions with that of Russia. The ability of 
those states to distance themselves from Russia 
is limited already, but it is beneficial from the 
point of view of the West that they still retain 
some margin of autonomy in matters concern-
ing Ukraine – it was because of this margin that 
Minsk could serve as a compromise location for 
the ceasefire negotiations in September 2014.
It is likely that any peace process implemented 
in the EU-EEU format would gradually reduce 
Ukraine’s role from an active member of talks 
to a mere subject of discussion. Russia, which 
already has a military advantage over Ukraine, 
greater economic potential and a stronger in-
ternational position, would be additionally 
strengthened in the institutional dimension 
as a representative of the region. In the new 
format Ukraine would find itself under more 
pressure and it would be forced to accept so-
lutions agreed by two organisations which it 
does not participate in. While a scenario of this 
kind could speed up the normalisation of the 
situation in eastern Ukraine in the short term, 
it would entail enormous adverse consequences 
for the country’s internal stability and geopo-
litical consequences for the EU. This is because 
Russia would not limit itself to establishing 
a kind of “condominium” of the two integration 
structures, but would use the disproportion 
in determination and the resources committed 
in order to quickly reduce any agreement 
reached over the heads of the Ukrainians to 
Making the EEU a party to the negotiations 
would offer Russia a convenient argument 
to force Belarus and Kazakhstan to align 
their positions with that of Russia. 
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a strategic abdication made by the European 
Union in the East, since the EEU has been con-
ceived as an alternative to the EU, and not as 
a complementary structure.
The very recognition of the Eurasian Union as 
a party to the talks by the Western states would 
set a precedent with significant consequences 
for European security. Conducting talks with 
Russia in the format of two competing inte-
gration blocs would be conducive to a new 
division of Europe. It would make it easier for 
Russian diplomacy to move away from discus-
sions about the international order in Europe 
and towards negotiations about where to draw 
the line which splits Europe into two parts. 
Russia would claim not only to represent the 
EEU member states, which it cannot practically 
be prevented from doing, but also to be the 
spokesperson for the interests of a more broad-
ly understood region. The Russian side has been 
unsuccessfully lobbying for an arrangement 
of this kind in previous years, as it advocated 
an institutionalisation of NATO’s dialogue with 
the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, 
the Russia-led military alliance.
If Russia managed to impose a discourse cen-
tred on the rivalry between geopolitical blocs, 
that would be a prelude to the Western states 
recognising the post-Soviet area as a Russian 
sphere of influence not only de facto, but also 
formally. The Russian side would take advantage 
of the dialogue between the EU and the EEU as 
a way to impose durable institutional solutions. 
It should be expected that a modified propos-
al for the European Security Treaty would re-
emerge of the type the then president Dmitry 
Medvedev lobbied for in 2008-2010 (and which 
was rightly rejected by the West). That initiative 
was based on an apparently harmless principle 
of “the indivisibility of security”, which pro-
hibited any actions that could be perceived by 
the other side as undermining its security, and 
threatened to de facto incapacitate the West’s 
policy in the post-Soviet area.4 An additional 
advantage Russia would gain from the imple-
mentation of the above scenario would concern 
a further marginalisation of American influence 
(including that of NATO) on the emerging new 
European security architecture.
If the EU today agrees to enter inter-bloc con-
sultations on Ukraine, tomorrow it will face 
Russia’s attempts to impose a similar format for 
all issues in the EU’s policy towards the Eastern 
Partnership that it deems important. The Krem-
lin’s reaction to the gesture of good will on the 
part of the EU, i.e. the postponement of provi-
sional application of the association agreement 
with Ukraine to 2016, may serve as an example 
of the Kremlin’s progressing geopolitical offen-
sive. Russia did not reciprocate the gesture with 
any constructive response, instead the EU’s de-
cision immediately provoked further demands 
for a legal and formal restatement of the com-
mitment and for it to be extended to Moldova. 
Interestingly, the unilateral concessions had 
presumably been worked out in August 2014 
in Minsk during a meeting of the leaders of the 
EU, Ukraine and the three EEU member states, 
i.e. in a format that was close to what Russia 
is now advocating.
4 For more information, see: M. Menkiszak, Greater Eu-
rope. Putin’s Vision of the European (Dis)integration, 
OSW Studies, October 2013, http://www.osw.waw.pl/
sites/default/files/greater_europe_net.pdf
Russia would not limit itself to establish-
ing a kind of “condominium” of the EU 
and the EEU, but would use the dispropor-
tion in determination and the resources 
committed in order to quickly reduce any 
agreement reached over the heads of the 
Ukrainians to a strategic abdication made 
by the European Union in the East. That is 
because the EEU has been conceived as 
an alternative to the EU, and not as a com-
plementary structure.
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Of course we do not know to what extent the 
West will be willing to accommodate Russia’s 
demands. However, one should be aware of the 
pattern in which ill-considered concessions con-
tribute to a further escalation of demands and 
lead to more tension as a result. This is the risk 
involved in allowing Russia to take part in the 
negotiations on behalf of the Eurasian Union.
Over the course of this year Ukrainians have 
paid a high price for their European aspirations 
and their objection to being incorporated into 
the Eurasian Union, first in the Maidan, and then 
in Donbass. Will they finally have to give in af-
ter the West quietly accepts a division of Europe 
into spheres of influence, disguised as debate on 
the new European order? The policy of contain-
ing Russia is costly, and the West’s ability to ex-
tract concessions from the Russian leadership at 
this stage is still limited. However, in this war, 
which is also a war of nerves, strategic patience 
is necessary. The fact that the set of effective so-
lutions is limited cannot serve as an argument in 
favour of solutions which are clearly detrimental.
